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1. INTRODUCTION 
In general, it is a difficult problem to compute the value of a differential 
game. However, for the practical purpose, it is enough to obtain an estimate 
of the values. Recently an effort has been made by Elliott and Kalton (l), 
Friedman (3, 4), Ladde and Lakshmikantham (5), and Lakshmikantham and 
Rao (7) to derive some information on the value of a given game either by 
employing Isaacs-Bellman equations or by comparing it with another simple 
game. 
In this paper, by employing the theory of differential inequalities and 
Lyapunov-like functions, we wish to obtain bounds for the values of the games 
of survival. In Section 2, we give preliminaries and definitions relative to the 
game of survival. In Section 3, we develop the general comparison principle 
based on theory of differential inequalities. These results generalize and 
extend the comparison theorems of Elliott and Kalton (1) and Friedman (3) 
with less demanding requirements. Furthermore, these results improved the 
earlier results of Ladde and Lakshmikantham (5). In Section 4, we give simple 
examples to illustrate the applicability of our results. 
2. PRELIMINARIES AND DEFINITIONS 
Consider a system of differential equations 
x’ = f(4 x, y, x), 4to) = x0 7 (2-l) 
where fe C[J x R" x Y x .Z,R%], J = [to, T], T > 0, Y, 2 are fixed 
compact sets of RP, RQ, respectively. 
We shall consider a differential game of survival G associated with (2.1) 
and the terminal set F C [to , co) x Rn, where F is closed and F I) [T, co) x Rn 
and payoff 
P(Y> 4 = &(Y, 4, $(Y, 4)) + jty h(s, x(s), Y(S), z(s)) A. (2.2) 
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Here t(y, z) is the first time of entry of the trajectory x(t) in to the terminal 
set F, corresponding to the controls y = y(t), x = x(t). A control function 
y(t) for the player y (z(t) for the player z) is a measureable function whose 
values are in Y(Z) almost everywhere. In the above game G, if the terminal set 
F = [T, co) x Rn, then we say that the differential game G is of fixed 
duration. Similarly, in the game G, if g(t, X) = 0 and h(t, X, y, z) = 1, then 
we call the differential game G a game of pursuit and evasion or a pursuit- 
evasion game. Hence the gams of fixed duration and games of pursuit- 
evasion are special cases of games of survival. 
Let us introduce a new dependent variable x,+i by 
4,l = 4, % Y9 4, x,+&J = 0. 
Set 
(2.3) 
f = (x, %+1), Lqt,) = Leo = (x0 , O), P = (t, 2): (t, x) EF, x,+~ E R}, 
PC4 4 y, 4 = (fdt, x, Y> 4Y,fn(t, x, Y, 4,w> % Y, 4) 
and 
With these notations, the differential game associated with (2.1) and (2.2) 
reduces to the differential game G associated with the differential system 
8’ = P<t, & Y, 4, a&J = i. ) (2.4) 
and the payoff 
B(Y> 4 = my, 4, W(Y, 4)). (2.5) 
It is known that the games G and G have the same upper and lower values. 
For more details see the recent monograph (2). So hereafter, we shall consider 
the game G in our discussion. 
We assume that f, h and g (2.1) and (2.2) satisfy the following conditions. 
(H,) f E C[J x R” x Y x 2, R”] and 
I 
T  
llf (4 x, Y? 4ll G b(t) [!I x II + 11, W) ds < 00; t, 
(H,) For any p there exists a function k,(t) such that if t E J, y E Y, z E 2 
and x1, x2 E R”, II xl II , II x2 II < p, then 
T  
IIf@> Xl 9 Y, 4 -f (4 x2 > Y, x)ll G k,(t) II Xl - *2 II 1 s k,(s) ds < cc ; to 
(Ha) h E C[J x R” x Y x 2, R], and g E C[J x R’“, R]. 
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Note that under (H,) and (Ha), for any control functions y(t), z(t), there 
corresponds a unique solution of (2.1) and the solutions of (2.1) are uniformly 
bounded, that is, [I Jc(t)il < p,, , t E j, for all control functions y(t), z(t). Also, 
if (Ha), holds a unique payoff is defined. The aim of the player y  
is to maximize the payoff and the aim of the player z is minimize it. 
The quantities Q+ and Q- are alternative definitions of upper and lower 
values, in place of y’ and V-. For Eore details see (1). 
For any @ E C[CF(pJ, R], where CF(p,,) is the closure of C&s) and 
C&J,) = {(t, 2) E J x Rn+l: (t, X) #F, jl x 11 d pO and xnfl E R}. 
We define a function D+@f(t, R, y, Z) relative to (2.4) by 
D+@i(t, 2, y, x) = liy+;tp k [@(t + h, S + @(t, 2, y, z)) - @(t, a)]. (2.6) 
Corresponding to the game associated with (2.4) and (2.5), we consider 
the scalar differential equation 
u’ = wi(t, u), u(4)) = %I > fori= 1,2, (2.7) 
where Wi E C[J x R, R], for i = 1,2. 
Here and after, we shall assume that Eq. (2.7) and the function @ satisfy 
the following hypotheses. 
(HJ WOE C[J x R RI an d assume that the maximal solution r(t, to, uo) 
of (2.7) for i = 1, existing for t > to and depends continuously on 
(to , uo) E J x R, for t > to; 
(%,) W, E C[J x R RI an d assume that the minimal solution y(t, to , us) 
of (2.7) for i = 2, exists for t E J and depends continuously on 
(to , uo) E J x R, for t > to; 
(HO) DE C[C&,), R] and @(t, “) 1 x IS ocally Lipschitzian in 4 for fixed 
t E J and for (t, 9, y, x) E C&p3 x Y x 2, 
D1-@i;(f, 2, y, 4 G fqt, 4 Y, 4, (2.8) 
where HE CIC?(po) x Y x 2, R] and satisfies the relation 
rnin m;x H(t, 32‘, y, Z) < Wl(t, @(t, a)); (2.9) 
(H7) Assume that the hypothesis (H,J holds except the inequalities (2.8) 
and (2.9) are replaced by inequalities 
Gk 6 Y, 4 < D+@p(t, f ,  Y, 4, (2.10) 
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where G E C[&,) x Y x 2, R] and satisfies the relation 
m;ln m;x G(t, 2, y, z) >, Ws(t, @(t, 9)); (2.11) 
(H,) For (t, a) E a$‘, 
‘u, 2) < @p(t, 2); (2.12) 
(H,) Assume that the hypothesis (H,) holds except that the inequality 
(2.12) is replaced by the inequality 
&, a) > qt, a). 
3. COMPARISON THEOREMS 
In this section, we wish to prove some comparison theorems which yield 
an estimate on Q+, Q-, V+, V-, U and V associated with (2.1) and (2.2). 
For more details about these quantities, readers are referred to (1). 
THEOREM 3.1. Assume that hypotheses (Hi), (H,), (Hs), (H4), (H,) and 
(H,) hold. Then, 
where u,, = @(to , GO). 
Proof. By employing the “strategy selection Theorem 5.1” in (1) with 
respect to the function H(t, X, y, z), we have 
WY w r(t), PY(Q) d wl(t, @(4 @))) + q(s), (3.2) 
for t E [to + s, T], where T(S) -+ 0 as s + 0+ and I(t) is the trajectory induced 
by (Y~Y = 4. F or g’ iven E > 0, there exists a S(E) = 6 > 0 such that s < 6 
implies T(S) < E. With this, the inequality (3.2) becomes 
w, w, r(t), pY(9 < wl(4 @(t, w + E 
for t E [to + 6, T]. This together with the relation (2.8), we have 
D+@ik $), r(t), PY(4) < Wl(4 @(4 $))) + 69 f E [to + 6 Tl. 
Set 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
@(t, 3((t)) = m(t), m(h + 6) = @(to + 8, 3((to + 6)). (3.5) 
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For small h > 0, we have 
m(t + h) - m(t) = qt + h, iqt + h)) - qt, a(t)> 
lim Sup m(t + h, - m(t) 
h-O+ h 
< liy+yp $ [@(t + h, s(t) + hf(t, $9, y(t), rBy(t))) - @(t, %40)1 
o+m(t> < D+@Ac @>, r(t), /?Y(W (3.6) 
Because of (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6), we obtain 
o++> < Wl(h m(t)> + c- (3.7) 
From (3.5), (3.7) and Lemma 1 . 3 . 1 in (6), it follows that 
m(t) < r(t, to + 8, +o + s>>, t 2 to + 6, (3.8) 
where r(t, to, uo) is the maximal solution of (2.7). This, together with the 
hypothesis (H,) and (3.5), yields 
#, %Y> PYgY,>> < MY, PYBr), to + 6, wo + w, (3.9) 
and hence, 
Qs+(to 3 x0) G ts[pyTl r(t, to + 6, m(to + a 
which implies, in view of the hypothesis (H4) that 
Q+(fo Y x0> G $y& r(t, to 3 eo>>* 
Theorem is proved. 
Remark 3.1. If the game G is a tixed duration, then 
Q+(to 7 x3 = v+vo > x0>; 
see Lemma 2.2 in (1). Hence, the Theorem 3.1 includes the results in (1,3,5). 
The following theorem gives a lower estimate for U. 
THEOREM 3.2. Let (H,), (H,), (Hs), (H5), (Hr) and (Ha) hold. Then, 
g$, ?4, to 3 uo) G U(to ? x0), (3.10) 
where u,, = @(to , go). 
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Proof. By applying the “strategy selection Theorem 5.2” in (1) relative 
to the function G(t, 4,y, s), we have 
JJ,‘z(t, @,(t, %))) - E < W, @), E.+), 4% (3.11) 
for t E [to , T]. The rest of the proof follows by using a similar argument as in 
the previous theorem. So we omit the details. 
Remark 3.2. In the previous Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, we may replace the 
hypothesis 
mjn m;x H(t, %, y, x) by 
m$ mVax G(t, 9, y, z) by 
mUax mzin H(t, 2, y, x), 
mUax mzin G(t, 2, y, z), 
and Q+ by Q- and U by V. With these, we can obtain similar estimates for 
Q- and V. 
Remark 3.3. Note that our results include the results in (1, 3) as very 
special cases. 
In fact, 
and 
TV&, u) = W2(t, u) EE 0 
which satisfy all hypotheses (H4)-(H,), in view of the definition of Lf and L-, 
where @(t, X) = O(t, X) + x,+r . Further note that these results are an 
improvement over some of the results in (5). 
4. EXAMPLES 
In this section, we shall given some examples to demonstrate the usefulness 
of our results. 
EXAMPLE 4.1. Consider the differential game associated with the dif- 
ferential system 
Xl ’ = 2x, - Xl3 + y - z, Xl(O) = 0, 
x2 ' = -x1 - QQ2 + 1) + y + x, x2(0) = 2, 
(4.1) 
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and the payoff 
$4~9 4 = i s,’ [x1(4 - 4s) - ~(4 + 441” ds. (4.1) 
Let -1 <y, z < 1. Set 
x3 = 4./t [x1(s) - x2(s) -y(s) $ z(s)]” ds, x3(O) = 0. 
0 
and d = (x1 , x2 , ~a), we have &t, a) = xa , for ail (t, a). Taking 
@(t, 2) = =$ (xl2 + xz2) + x,et-l 
and hence, 
D+qt, 4,y, z) < qt, a) + 1 = qt, f, y, 2). (4.3) 
Comparison equations, 
zd=u+ 1, uo = 1, (4.4) 
and note that j(l, a) < @(l, 9). 
With these, it is easy to verify that the assumptions of Theorem 3.1 are 
satisfied. Consequently, we have 
V+(to,xo)<2e- 1, 
in view of the Theorem 3.1 and Remark 3.1. 
EXAMPLE 4.2. Consider a game of pursuit and evasion where the dynam- 
ical system is given by 
Xl ' = 4, %,X2) +r, Xl(O) = x10 7 
(4.5) 
x2 ' = w, x1 , x2) + z, x2(0) = x20 9 
where a, 6, xl , x2 , Y, z are n-vectors. Let the control sets be 
y=~Y:llYll eoI>9 2 = G: II .z II < PI- 
The pursuer is y and the evader is z. The terminal set 
where 
F = (4 ~1, x2): I x, - x2 I <p, t > 01, 
P>O and To = lx10 - x20 I > P* 
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Assume that a and b in (4.5) satisfies (HJ-(H,), we shall prove that if 
and 
(Xl - x2) * [a(& *I > x2) - w, Xl 9 %)I < 0, (4.7) 
then the pursuer y can capture the evader z in finite time. 
For any T > 0, consider the game G of fixed duration T associated with 
(4.5) and the payoff 
Take 
P(Y, 4 = II G’) - xz(T)ll” = g(T, x,(T), x2GW (4.8) 
@(t, xl , x2) = II x1 - x2 II2 expk(t - TN, (4.9) 
where E > 0 and arbitrary small and can be chosen later on. Now, from (4.7), 
we have 
o+Qqt, Xl , 32 , y, 4 < E@@, Xl , x2) + @&, Xl , x2> . (y - x). (4.10) 
Set 
In view of (4.6), we can choose c > 0 so small that 
rn:x mm H(t, x, y, z) < --~@(t, xi , x2), 
and this E will be used in (4.9). Note that g(T, x(T)) = @(T, x(T)) and 
u’ = --Eu = W1(t, u), u(0) = U(j) solution of which is continuous with 
respect to initial data. Observe that the hypotheses of Theorem 3.1 are satis- 
fied. Hence, 
11 x1(T) - x2( T)j12 < r,,WT. 
It is easy to observe that if T 3 (2/e) ln[r,/p], then 
II xl(T) - ~2U”)ll~ < P’. 
Thus T = (2/c) In[r,,/p] is a capture time. 
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